Wednesday, 26 March 2014

Please read the forensic article (in course documents), in a350 word minumun essay (excluding identifiers, and any reference citations) reflect on the information in the article

Please read the forensic article (in course documents), in a350 word minumun essay (excluding identifiers, and any reference citations) reflect on the information in the article. What are the changes that the authors believe are coming as forensics contiues to be used in courtrooms. What is your opinion on the validity of forensic eveidence.
Use MLA or other recognized format. Standard English.

will be turned in through turnitin.com.no internet content. 
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The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science Michael J. Saks1 and Jonathan J. Koehler2 Converging legal and scientific forces are pushing the traditional forensic identification sciences toward fundamental change. The assumption of discernible uniqueness that resides at the core of these fields is weakened by evidence of errors in proficiency testing and in actual cases.Click here for more on this paper.......
Click here to have a similar A+ quality paper done for you by one of our writers within the set deadline at a discounted Changes in the law pertaining to the admissibility of expert evidence in court, together with the emergence of DNA typing as a model for a scientifically defensible approach to questions of shared identity, are driving the older forensic sciences toward a new scientific paradigm. Little more than a decade ago, forensic individualization scientists compared pairs of marks (handwriting, fingerprints, tool marks, hair, tire marks, bite marks, etc.), intuited whether the marks matched, and testified in court that whoever or whatever made one made the other. Courts almost never excluded the testimony. Cross-examination rarely questioned the foundations of the asserted expertise or the basis of the analyst_s certainty. Today, that once-complacent corner of the law and science interface has begun to unravel—or at least to regroup. The news carries reports of erroneous forensic identifications of hair, bullets, handwriting, footprints, bite marks, and even venerated fingerprints. Scientists have begun to question the core assumptions of numerous forensic sciences (1–6).Click here for more on this paper.......
Click here to have a similar A+ quality paper done for you by one of our writers within the set deadline at a discounted Federal funding has materialized to support research that examines long-asserted but unproven claims. Courts have started taking challenges to asserted forensic science expertise seriously (1). A dispassionate scientist or judge reviewing the current state of the traditional forensic sciences would likely regard their claims as plausible, underresearched, and oversold. The traditional forensic individualization sciences rest on a central assumption: that two indistinguishable marks must have been produced by a single object....
The Coming Paradigm Shift in
Forensic Identification Science
Michael J. Saks
and Jonathan J. Koehler
2
Converging legal and scientific forces are pushing the traditional forensic identification
sciences toward fundamental change. The assumption of discernible uniqueness that resides at the core of these fields is weakened by evidence of errors in proficiency testing and
in actual cases. Changes in the law pertaining to the admissibility of expert evidence in
court, together with the emergence of DNA typing as a model for a scientifically defensible approach to questions of shared identity, are driving the older forensic sciences
toward a new scientific paradigm.
ittle more than a decade ago, forensic individualization scientists compared pairs
of marks (handwriting, fingerprints, tool
marks, hair, tire marks, bite marks, etc.), intuited whether the marks matched, and testified
in court that whoever or whatever made one
made the other. Courts almost never excluded
the testimony. Cross-examination rarely questioned the foundations of the asserted expertise
or the basis of the analyst_s certainty.
Today, that once-complacent corner of
the law and science interface has begun to
unravel—or at least to regroup.Click here for more on this paper.......
Click here to have a similar A+ quality paper done for you by one of our writers within the set deadline at a discounted The news carries reports of erroneous forensic identifications of hair, bullets, handwriting, footprints,
bite marks, and even venerated fingerprints.
Scientists have begun to question the core
assumptions of numerous forensic sciences
(1–6). Federal funding has materialized to support research that examines long-asserted but
unproven claims. Courts have started taking
challenges to asserted forensic science expertise seriously (1). A dispassionate scientist or
judge reviewing the current state of the traditional forensic sciences would likely regard
their claims as plausible, underresearched, and
The traditional forensic individualization sciences rest on a central assumption: that
two indistinguishable marks must have been
produced by a single object. Traditional forensic scientists seek to link crime scene evidence to a single person or objectBto the
exclusion of all others in the world[(7, 8).
They do so by leaning on the assumption of
discernible uniqueness. According to this assumption, markings produced by different
people or objects are observably different. Thus,
when a pair of markings is not observably
different, criminalists conclude that the marks
were made by the same person or object.
Although lacking theoretical or empirical
foundations, the assumption of discernible
uniqueness offers important practical benefits
to the traditional forensic sciences.Click here for more on this paper.......
forensic scientists to draw bold, definitive conclusions that can make or break cases. It excuses the forensic sciences from developing
measures of object attributes, collecting population data on the frequencies of variations in
those attributes, testing attribute independence,
or calculating and explaining the probability
that different objects share a common set of
observable attributes. Without the discernible
uniqueness assumption, far more scientific work
would be needed, and criminalists would need
to offer more tempered opinions in court.
Legal and scientific forces are converging
to drive an emerging skepticism about the
claims of the traditional forensic individualization sciences. As a result, these sciences
are moving toward a new scientific paradigm.Click here for more on this paper.......
EWe use the notion of paradigm shift not as
a literal application of Thomas Kuhn_s concept (9), but as a metaphor highlighting the
transformation involved in moving from a prescience to an empirically grounded science.^
Two such forces are outgrowths of DNA typing: the discovery of erroneous convictions and
a model for a scientifically sound identification
science. A third force is the momentous change
in the legal admissibility standards for expert
testimony. A final force grows from studies
of error rates across the forensic sciences.
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1
College of Law, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ
85287, USA. E-mail: saks@asu.edu
2
McCombs School
of Business, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712,
Fig. 1.Factors associated with wrongful conviction in 86 DNA exoneration cases, based on case
analysis data provided by the Innocence Project, Cardozo School of Law (New York, NY), and
computed by us. Percentages exceed 100% because more than one factor was found in many
cases. Red bars indicate factors related to forensic science.
5 AUGUST 2005 VOL 309 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org 892
Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations
During the past decade, scores of people who
were convicted of serious crimes—including
atleast14whohadbeensentencedtodeath—
have been exonerated by DNA analyses of
crime scene evidence that had not been tested
at the time of their trials (10).Click here for more on this paper.......
surprising to learn that erroneous convictions
sometimes occur, and that new science and
technology can help detect and correct those
mistakes. Nor was it surprising to learn, from
an analysis of 86 such cases (Fig. 1), that
erroneous eyewitness identifications are the
most common contributing factor to wrongful
convictions. What was unexpected is that
erroneous forensic science expert testimony
is the second most common contributing
factor to wrongful convictions, found in 63%
of those cases. These data likely understate the
relative contribution of forensic science expert
testimony to erroneous convictions. Whereas
lawyers, police, and lay witnesses participate
in virtually every criminal case, forensic
science experts participate in a smaller subset
of cases—about 10 to 20% of criminal cases
during the era when these DNA exonerations
were originally tried (11).Click here for more on this paper.......
Figure 1 also indicates that forensic scientists are the witnesses most likely to present
misleading or fraudulent testimony. Deceitful
forensic scientists are a minor sidelight to this
paper, but a sidelight that underscores cultural
differences between normal science and forensic science (12,13). In normal science, academically gifted students receive four or more years
of doctoral training where much of the socialization into the culture of science takes place.
This culture emphasizes methodological rigor,
openness, and cautious interpretation of data.
In forensic science, 96% of positions are held
by persons with bachelor’s degrees (or less),
3% master’s degrees, and 1% Ph.D.s (14).
When individuals who are not steeped in the
culture of science work in an adversarial, crimefighting culture, there is a substantial risk that a
different set of norms will prevail.Click here for more on this paper.......
former forensic scientist noted, this pressurepacked environment can lead to data fudging
and fabrication: ‘‘All [forensic science] experts
are tempted, many times in their careers, to
report positive results when their inquiries
come up inconclusive, or indeed to report a
negative result as positive’’ [(15), p. 17].
DNA Typing as the New Model for
Scientific Forensic Identification
Much of the above criticism does not apply
to the science of DNA typing as practiced
today. Indeed, DNA typing can serve as a
model for the traditional forensic sciences in
three important respects. First, DNA typing
technology was an application of knowledge
derived from core scientific disciplines. This
provided a stable structure for future empirical
work on the technology. Second, the courts
and scientists scrutinized applications of the
technology in individual cases.Click here for more on this paper.......
early, unscientific practices were rooted out.
Third, DNA typing offered data-based, probabilistic assessments of the meaning of evidentiary ‘‘matches.’’ This practice represented
an advance over potentially misleading match/
no-match claims associated with other forensic
identification sciences.Click here for more on this paper.......
Immediately after DNA’s first courtroom
appearance in the 1980s, scientists from disciplines as varied as statistics, psychology, and
evolutionary biology debated the strengths and
limitations of forensic DNA evidence. Blueribbon panels were convened, conferences were
held, unscientific practices were identified, data were collected, critical papers
were written, and standards were developed and implemented. The scientific debates focused on the adequacy of
DNA databases (16), the computation
of DNA match probabilities (17), the
training of DNA analysts (18), the presentation of DNA matches in the courtroom (19), and the role of error rates
(20). In some cases, disputants worked
together to find common ground (21).Click here for more on this paper.......
These matters were not resolved by the
forensic scientists themselves, by fiat, or
by neglect. Most exaggerated claims
and counterclaims about DNA evidence
have been replaced by scientifically
defensible propositions. Although some
disagreement remains (22), the scientific process worked.
One of the great strengths of DNA
typing is that it uses a statistical approach based onpopulation genetics
theory and empirical testing. Experts
evaluate matches between suspects and
crime scene DNA evidence in terms
of the probability of random matches
across different reference populations
(e.g., different ethnicities).Click here for more on this paper.......
identify the frequency with which various alleles occur at different locations on the
DNA strand. The traditional forensic sciences
could and should emulate this approach (23).
Each subfield must construct databases of
sample characteristics and use these databases to support a probabilistic approach to
identification. Fingerprinting could be one of
the first areas to make the transition to this
approach because large fingerprint databases
already exist. The greatest challenge in this
effort would be to develop measures of the
complex images presented by fingerprints,
tool marks, bite marks, handwriting, etc.
(Figs. 2 and 3). Forensic scientists will need
to work with experts in differential geometry,
topology, or other fields to develop workable
A second data collection effort that would
strengthen the scientific foundation of the forensic sciences involves estimating error rates.
Although the theoretical promise of forensic
technology is considerable, the practical value
of any particular technology is limited by the
extent to which potentially important errors
arise. The best way to identify the frequency
with which errors occur is to conduct blind,
external proficiency tests using realistic samples. A proficiency test requires analysts to
make judgments about samples whose properties are known. External proficiency tests are
conducted by an agency unaffiliated with the
forensic scientist’s laboratory.Click here for more on this paper.......
important to the integrity of proficiency tests
because laboratories have strong incentives to
Fig. 2.Bite mark evidence exhibit from trial of
Ray Krone, suggesting alignment of a cast of
Krone’s dentition with bite wounds in victim’s
flesh [State v. Krone, 182 Ariz. 319 (1995)]. A
forensic odontologist testified that this showed
Krone to be the biter.Click here for more on this paper.......
murder and sentenced to death, but a decade
later he was exonerated by DNA analysis. [Source:
E. Thomas Barham (Los Alamitos, CA) and Alan
Simpson (Phoenix, AZ), attorneys for Krone]
Fig. 3.Image of two bullets viewed through a comparison microscope. The bullets were fired from two
consecutively manufactured Smith & Wesson 38 Special revolver barrels. Whether fired through the same or
different barrels, numerous matching and nonmatching
striations are engraved onto bullets. To reliably identify
the barrel through which a questioned bullet was fired,
an examiner must distinguish among class, subclass, and
individual characteristics.Click here for more on this paper.......
Click here to have a similar A+ quality paper done for you by one of our writers within the set deadline at a discounted These two bullets illustrate subclass characteristic agreement of striated markings on a
groove impression that could be mistaken for individual
characteristics. Without investigating the potential for
subclass carryover, the examiner could mistake these as
having been fired from the same gun. [Source: Bruce
Moran, firearms examiner with the Sacramento County
(CA) District Attorney, Laboratory of Forensic Services]
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www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 309 5 AUGUST 2005 893
be perceived as error-free.Click here for more on this paper.......
test would be a blind proficiency test, in
which the analyst believes the test materials
are part of ordinary case work. Blindness increases the validity of proficiency test results
because it ensures that analysts treat the test
sample as they would other case samples. Although proficiency tests are used in many
forensic sciences, the tests are generally infrequent, internal, and unrealistic; blind tests
are practically nonexistent.
Changes in the Law
Until recently, courts assessed expertise by
looking for superficial indicia of validity. In
the 19th century, courts were impressed by
‘‘qualifications’’ and success in the marketplace. If the market valued an asserted expertise or expert, courts generally did, too.
InFrye v. United States[293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923)], a federal appellate court
confronted the question of admissibility of an expertise that had no life in
any commercial marketplace.Click here for more on this paper.......
court solved the problem by substituting an intellectual marketplace. The
court asked whether the proffered
expertise had ‘‘gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.’’ Sixty years later, theFrye
test had become the dominant expert
evidence filter in American courts.Click here for more on this paper.......
In 1993, the law began to catch up
with the scientific method. InDaubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals[509
U.S. 579 (1993)], the U.S. Supreme
Court introduced a new standard for
the admissibility of scientific evidence. UnderDaubert, proffered scientific testimony must be shown to
stand on a dependable foundation.Click here for more on this paper.......
court suggested that trial judges making this determination consider whether the proffered science has been tested, the
methodological soundness of that testing, and
the results of that testing. The Dauberttest in
effect lowers the threshold for admission of
sound cutting-edge science and raises the
threshold for long-asserted expertise that lacks
a scientific foundation. Seriously applied, the
Dauberttest subjects the forensic sciences to a
first-principles scientific scrutiny that poses a
profound challenge to fields that lack rigorous
supporting data.Click here for more on this paper.......
United States v. Starzecpyzel[880 F. Supp.
1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)] offered an early indication of howDaubertcould change judicial
views. After an extensive hearing on the soundness of asserted handwriting identification expertise, a federal district court concluded that
the field had no scientific basis: ‘‘[T]he testimony at the Dauberthearing firmly established that forensic document examination,
despite the existence of a certification program, professional journals and other trappings
of science, cannot, afterDaubert, be regarded
as ‘scientificIknowledge’’’ (p. 1038). However, the court did not exclude this unscientific
testimony. It reasoned that handwriting identification did not have to reach the Daubert
standard becauseDaubertapplied only to scientific evidence, and handwriting identification
plainly was not scientific evidence.Click here for more on this paper.......
a forensic science was found to stand on a
weak foundation, the threshold of admission
was lowered to accommodate this weakness.
In Kumho Tire v. Carmichael[526 U.S.
137 (1999)], the Supreme Court directly confronted the question of whether Daubert
applies to nonsciences. A consortium of law
enforcement organizations prepared an amicus
brief urging thatDaubertscrutiny not be extended to the testimony of police agency expert witnesses. The brief argued that ‘‘the
great bulk of expert testimony provided by
law enforcement officers does not involve scientific theories, methodologies, techniques, or
data in any respectI.Click here for more on this paper.......
accident reconstruction, fingerprint, footprint
and handprint [identification], handwriting
analysis, firearms markings and toolmarks
and the unique characteristics of guns, bullets,
and shell casings, and bloodstain pattern identification’’ (24). Ironically, then, fields that
initially gained entry to the courts by declaring
themselves to be ‘‘sciences’’ now sought to
remain in court by denying any connection
with scientific methods, data, or principles.
Despite efforts to preserve the ‘‘nonscience’’
loophole, the Supreme Court doctrinally sealed
it shut when Kumho Tireheld that all expert
testimony must pass appropriate tests of
validity to be admissible in court.
AlthoughDaubert’s testing recommendations are familiar to most scientists, there has
been remarkably little research on the accuracy of traditional forensic sciences. Proficiency tests in some fields offer a step in
the right direction, even though simple tasks
and infrequent peer review limit their value.
Nonetheless, the available data hint that
some forensic sciences are best interpreted in
tandem with error rates estimated from sound
studies.
Unfortunately, forensic scientists often reject error rate estimates in favor of arguments
that theirs is an error-free science.Click here for more on this paper.......
that all certified document examiners in the
United States would agree with his conclusions in every case [(25), p. 196]. Likewise,
fingerprint experts commonly claim that all
fingerprint experts would reach the same conclusions about every print (2). Such hubris
was on display in spring 2004 when the FBI
declared that a fingerprint recovered from a
suspicious plastic bag near the scene
of a terrorist bombing in Madrid provided a ‘‘100 percent match’’ to an
Oregon attorney (Fig. 4). The FBI
eventually conceded error when Spanish
fingerprint experts linked the print to
someone else (26).Click here for more on this paper.......
The FBI and other agencies often
seek to preserve the illusion of perfection after disclosure of such errors by
distinguishing between human errors
(‘‘possible’’) and errors of method
(‘‘impossible’’). A leading FBI scientist
explained the distinction to the court in
United States v. Llera-Plaza I[58 Fed.
R. Evid. Serv. 1 (E.D. Pa. 2002)]: ‘‘We
have to understand that error rate is a
difficult thing to calculate. I mean, people are trying to do this, it shouldn’t be
done, it can’t be doneI.Click here for more on this paper.......
is a wispy thing like smoke, it changes
over timeI. If you made a mistake in
the past, certainly that’s valid information I
but to say there’s an error rate that’s definable
would be a misrepresentationI.Now,error
rate deals with people, you should have a
method that is defined and stays within its
limits, so it doesn’t have error at all. So the
method is one thing, people making mistakes
is another issue.’’Click here for more on this paper.......
Such claims are problematic. First, the
suggestion that humans err but forensic techniques do not is unfalsifiable. It is impossible
to disentangle ‘‘method’’ errors from ‘‘practitioner’’ errors in fields where the method is
primarily the judgment of the examiner. Second, even if such disentanglement were possible, it is a red herring. When fact-finders
hear evidence of a forensic match, a proper
assessment of the probative value of that match
requires awareness of the chance that a mistake
was made. The source of such a mistake is
irrelevant for this purpose. If method errors
could be distinguished from practitioner errors,
Fig. 4.(A) A latent fingerprint believed to belong to a terrorist
involved in train bombings in Madrid, Spain, in March 2004.Click here for more on this paper.......
(B) A database print belonging to Brandon Mayfield of Portland, Oregon. On the basis of these prints (though not necessarily these very images), FBI fingerprint examiners erroneously
identified Mayfield as the bomber (26). [Source: Problem Idents,
onin.com/fp/problemidents.html#madrid]
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5 AUGUST 2005 VOL 309 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org 894
a 1% method error affects the probative value
of the match in exactly the same way as a 1%
practitioner error. Identifying sources of error
is relevant for improving forensic science practice, but it plays no role in identifying the
probative importance of a match.Click here for more on this paper.......
Third, the suggestion that error rates do
not exist because they change over time and
are not specific to the case at hand is a baserate fallacy. In this fallacy of reasoning, people underuse (or willfully ignore) general
background data in judgment tasks because
they believe the data are irrelevant to the
instant case. However, general background
data (or base rates) are relevant for specific
predictions (27, 28).Click here for more on this paper.......
risk estimates for a disease fluctuate and are
developed on patients other than the patient
now seeking medical advice, these estimates
provide information useful for predicting
whether this patient will contract the disease.
A 20% base-rate risk of contracting the disease makes it more likely that the patient
will get the disease than would a 1% risk.
Likewise, an X% base-rate risk of error in a
given forensic science provides some indication of the chance that a particular conclusion
is in error (22).Click here for more on this paper.......
Data from proficiency tests and other examinations suggest that forensic errors are not
minor imperfections. Spectrographic voice
identification error rates are as high as 63%,
depending on the type of voice sample tested
[(1), chap. 31]. Handwriting error rates average around 40% and sometimes approach
100% [(1), chap. 28]. False-positive error rates
for bite marks run as high as 64% [(1), chap.
30]. Those for microscopic hair comparisons
are about 12% (using results of mitochondrial
DNA testing as the criterion) (29). Click here for more on this paper.......
examiners generally fare better, although
data from a well-known forensic testing program contradict industry boasts of perfect, or
even near-perfect, agreement (30). Since
1995, about one-fourth of examiners failed
to correctly identify all latent prints in this
test(whichincludes9to12latentprintsand
palmprints). About 4 to 5% of examiners
committed false-positive errors on at least
one latent. In one test, 20% of examiners
mistook one person’s prints for those of his
twin. The editor of the leading fingerprintClick here for more on this paper.......
journal called this performance ‘‘unacceptable’’ [(31), p. 524]. It is noteworthy that
these misidentifications are not confined to a
single lab, circumstance, or marking. Moreover, the misidentification rates do not show
a clear pattern of improvement (the misidentification rates in 2004 were 4 to 6%).
Nor are these errors limited to arguably artificial testing situations; erroneous fingerprint
identifications have made their way out of
the crime lab and into prosecutions in at least
21 documented cases (32).Click here for more on this paper.......
Forensic science proficiency tests and examinations are obviously imperfect indicators
of the rate at which errors occur in practice.
This fact does not justify ignoring the worrisome data these tests have yielded. Indeed,
these data are probably best regarded as lowerbound estimates of error rates. Because the
tests are relatively easy (according to test participants), and because participants know that
mistakes will be identified and punished, test
error rates (particularly the false-positive error
rate) probably are lower than those in everyday casework (33, 34).
The studies mentioned above cry out for
attention and follow-up investigations. In light
of the law’s growing reluctance to accept
experts’ personal guarantees in lieu of scientific data, these studies should increase
candor about performance and create pressure for improvement.
The traditional forensic sciences need look
no further than their newest sister discipline,
DNA typing, for guidance on how to put the
science into forensic identification science.
This effort should begin with adoption of the
basic-research model. Just as DNA scientists
tested the genetic assumptions that undergirded
DNA typing theory (e.g., Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium), traditional forensic scientists should
design experiments that test the core assumptions of their fields. As basic research knowledge grows, experts will be able to inform
courts about the relative strengths and weaknesses of their theories and methods, and
suggest how that knowledge applies to individual cases.
At the same time, data should be collected
on the frequency with which markings and attribute variations occur in different populations. In addition to their case-specific benefits,Click here for more on this paper.......
these data may also facilitate the development
of artificial intelligence or computer-aided pattern recognition programs for the identification
sciences. Forensic scientists might also adopt
protocols, such as blind examinations in combination with realistic samples, that minimize
the risks that their success rates will be inflated
and their conclusions biased by extraneous evidence and assumptions (34). When matches
are identified, forensic scientists in all fields
would compute and report random-match probabilities similar to those used in DNA typing.
These estimates—in combination with error
rate estimates provided by mandatory, wellconstructed proficiency tests—would inform
fact-finders about the probative value of the
evidentiary match.Click here for more on this paper.......
Simply put, we envision a paradigm shift
in the traditional forensic identification sciences in which untested assumptions and semiinformed guesswork are replaced by a sound
scientific foundation and justifiable protocols.
Although obstacles exist both inside and outside forensic science, the time is ripe for the
traditional forensic sciences to replace antiquated assumptions of uniqueness and perfection with a more defensible empirical and
probabilistic foundation.Click here for more on this paper.......
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10.1126/science.1111565
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